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LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL REFORM AND THE
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM: A LEGAL BLUEPRINT
JAMES E. HERGET*
INTRODUCTION
GREAT deal has been written about the jurisdictional problem in
metropolitan areas.' Some of this material deals with very limited
aspects of the problem. Other articles report on what has histori-
cally been done in particular localities.2 Still other sources discuss gen-
eral policy and theory.' But there are few sources for the lawyer to draw
from when he seeks to tackle the sticky legal problems which come to
the fore when a proposal for metropolitan government is made. It is the
purpose of this paper to expose the more important guideposts of the
law, and to suggest ways of accomplishing the desired ends, within an
existing institutional framework. It is felt that once the reader has
worked his way through the maze, he will be in a better position as
either an advisor, legislator, or draftsman, to deal effectively with the
legal aspects of the jurisdictional problem.
Although the problem is indigenous to almost every state in the na-
tion to a greater or lesser degree, the history, geography, governmental
structure, and state constitution of each locality differs. Thus, if we try
to make our discussion applicable to the nation as a whole, it becomes
very difficult to come to grips with concrete problems. For this reason,
we shall mainly concentrate on one jurisdiction, the State of Illinois,
* Mr. Herget is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa Law School.
He received both an A.B. and LL.B. from the University of Illinois. He is a member of
the Illinois Bar.
1 See Fordham and others, Symposium-Metropolitan Regionalism: Developing Gov-
ernmental Concepts, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1957), and R. Everett, R. Leach and others,
Symposium-Urban Problems and Prospects, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1965), for
two good symposia dealing with various interrelated urban problems which touch upon
the jurisdictional problem.
2 See, e.g., Milner, The Metropolitan Toronto Plan, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 570 (1957),
and Note, The Urban County: A Study of New Approaches to Local Government in
Metropolitan Areas, 73 HAav. L. Rav. 526 (1960).
8 See, e.g., Wood, Metropolitan Government, 1975: An Extrapolation of Trends, 52 Am.
POL. Sci. REv. 108, 112 (1958).
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and one locality, the Chicago area. That particular metropolitan area
merits our attention, not only because it reflects the jurisdictional prob-
lem at its worst,4 but also because the Illinois legal framework is a
typical one, and the legal experience is rich in both innovation and
precedent. Therefore, a study of the legal aspects of metropolitan gov-
ernment in this particular locality should be illuminating for other lo-
calities as well.
This article is written on the assumption that some type of legal
reform in the government of metropolitan areas, and the Chicago area
in particular, would be beneficial. This point of view is not, of course,
universally shared.' However, any discussion of reform in the structure
of local government must be made within the context of some realistic
limits. Obviously, if it were readily in our power to change the federal
constitution, the state constitution, the attitudes of local politicians
with vested interests, and numerous other imponderables, there would
be no legal problems to worry about in refashioning the governmental
apparatus. Fortunately, perhaps, the power to effect such sweeping
changes is diffuse and difficult to call forth. Hence, in the following
discussion certain assumptions are made for purposes of realistic anal-
ysis. These assumptions are: (1) that reform must take place within
the present constitutional framework; (2) that the financial resources
of local government will remain substantially the same, i.e., property
taxes and charges for services will account for the bulk of the revenue;
(3) that the dissolution of existing governmental bodies will be strongly
opposed by powerful interest groups, primarily the office holders in
those bodies. All this is not to say, of course, that constitutional amend-
ment is always impossible, or that the local partisans cannot ever be
enlightened so as to appreciate the big picture, or that citizens can
never be made to appreciate novel innovations. These things can be,
and have been done, but only with herculean effort and unusual leader-
ship.
THE PROBLEM
Although the term "metropolitan area" is used meaningfully in
normal discourse, it is a vague and imprecise phrase. Social scientists
4For an excellent and comprehensive report, although now somewhat dated, on the
informational background of the Chicago problem, see GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE
C31ICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA (L. Lyon ed. 1957).
5 See the able discussion in BANFIELD AND GRODZINS, GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING 3N
METROPOLITAN AREAS ch. 2 (1958).
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and statisticians have advanced definitions of varying complexity, but
for purposes of this discussion we may define it as an integrated eco-
nomic and social unit with a recognized population nucleus of 50,000
or more. This rather broad and diffuse definition is sufficient to include
the federal government's Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (here-
inafter SMSA).6 By an "integrated economic and social unit" is meant
a territorial area in which the residents are dependent upon others in
the same area for jobs, recreation, transportation, food, news and
entertainment, etc., on a daily basis. With respect to the Chicago area
itself, this integration has been characterized in the following way:
Metropolitan Chicago . . . has many different sections performing a variety of
functions. It has a number of different types of communities. Within it there is a
variegated pattern of physical, social, and economic interaction which transcends
the corporate limits of its municipalities, the lines defining its counties, and the
boundary of Illinois and Indiana. People move freely across these lines to and
from work, shopping, recreation, and visits with friends. Money may be earned
in one locality, spent in another, and banked or invested in another. The raw
material for a product may be processed in one location, its parts assembled in
another, and its distribution handled from a warehouse in another3
It is true, of course, that there are different "communities" within any
particular territory. These "communities" may be oriented along so-
cial, religious, professional, geographical, ethnic, economic, or other
lines, so that it admittedly is a difficult practical problem to define with
any precision the overall integrated metropolitan area.8
It may be fairly said, however, that the typical metropolitan area
today consists of a densely populated core city surrounded by numer-
ous suburbs and stretches of unincorporated area. Superimposed upon
this patchwork of municipalities are one or more counties, numerous
townships, several school districts, sanitary districts, park districts,
airport authorities and other ad hoc governmental bodies. In 1962, there
were 1,060 such governmental units in the Chicago Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Area (995 of which had the power to tax property).
Comparable figures for other areas show the St. Louis SMSA with 482
6 For a brief discussion of the definition of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 897
(1967).
7 GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA 21 (L. Lyon ed.
1957). The reader should note that this paper does not attempt to deal with the
interstate aspect of the problem.
8 This problem is dealt with comprehensively in Reiss, The Community and the Cor-
porate Area, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 443 (1957).
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governments, Pittsburgh with 806, New York with 555, and San Fran-
cisco with 346.
Since the metropolitan area is by definition an economically and
socially integrated unit or community, we can readily see the possibility
that community-wide problems may arise to which there is no com-
munity-wide governmental machinery to respond. This has been called
the "disjuncture between the metropolitan community and the corpo-
rate areas which serve it." Putting it another way, the fractionation of
local government in metropolitan areas itself creates a separate polit-
ical and legal problem, the jurisdictional problem.
Examples of this jurisdictional problem come to mind readily. Calu-
met City, Illinois, can do nothing about its highly polluted air because
the pollution originates at steel mills and oil refineries in nearby Gary
and Whiting, Indiana. The City of Chicago may have an adequate
water supply from Lake Michigan, but the suburb of Elmhurst may
have to pay very dearly for the same commodity. A particular suburban
area may have excellent physical facilities for its schools and highly-
paid teachers because there is a substantial industry to form a good
tax base in the school district, yet a neighboring school district covering
what are essentially high density "bedroom" communities may struggle
to make ends meet. The police force in a small suburb may consist of
one constable and a night deputy, both untrained, ill-equipped, and
poorly paid. The same suburb probably has a volunteer fire department;
yet, there is no way to pay for anything better. These examples could
be multiplied at great length in the areas of planning and zoning, mass
transit facilities, and sewage facilities.
What has been termed here the "jurisdictional problem" is really a
set of interrelated consequences, flowing from the atomization of local
governments. These might be enumerated as separate problems in the
following categories:
(a) Territorial Limitation. Any particular governmental unit is un-
able by itself to meet an area-wide problem. (Example: air pol-
lution).
(b) Inefficiency. There is inefficiency in the performance of public
services because the scale of governmental operation is too
9 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 908, 922
(1967).
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small or because of duplication (Example: the one-man police
force, separate water filtration plants in adjoining villages).
(c) Inequitable Financing. There arise inequities in the tax base
between different corporate boundaries even though the entire
area is economically and socially interdependent (Example: the
adjacent rich and poor school districts).
(d) No Responsibility for Resolving Conflicting Interests. There is
a lack of any effective planning and budgeting agency which can
weigh the demands for various public services against the avail-
ble tax dollars, and make intelligent decisions on priorities for
the community as a whole.
(e) Failure to Accommodate Growth. No provision is made for fu-
ture growth so that, as new territory becomes economically and
socially integrated into the metropolis, it also becomes politically
and legally integrated.
Can anything be done about the multiphase jurisdictional problem?
A number of solutions have been proposed, and some have been tried.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Let us first review solutions to the jurisdictional problem which have
been proposed or adopted from time to time, but are not very adaptable
to the Chicago metropolitan area or, for that matter, to most other
metropolitan areas. It should be noted, however, that some of these
solutions have been successful in varying degrees in some circumstan-
ces.
(1) Intergovernmental Contracting. This has been moderately suc-
cessful in some areas in meeting problem (b) above, particularly
where the service contracted for (e.g. water supply) is one
which brings in its own operating revenue.'" However, this de-
vice usually does not help in solving problems (a), (c), (d), or
(e).
(2) Single Purpose Authority. Creation of an authority" (sanitary
district, port authority, airport authority) to serve an entire
10 The City of Chicago sells water at a "wholesale" price to a large number of suburbs.
GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA 90 (L. Lyon ed. 1957).
11 Examples in the Chicago area are the Chicago Park District, ILL. REV. STAT., ch.
105, § 33.1 (1967) ; the Chicago Sanitary District, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 42, § 320 (1967);
and the Chicago Transit Authority, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111 2/3, § 301 (1967).
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metropolitan area (seldom found) can successfully solve prob-
lems (a), (b), and (c); however, it intensifies problem (d) and
makes it even more difficult to solve. It does not meet problem
(e).
(3) Annexation. Although still possible in the case of a few of our
larger cities, annexation of suburban territory by the core city
is simply a political impossibility in most places, certainly in
Chicago. 2
(4) Area Planning Commission. This device helps to meet problems
(a), (d), and (e), but the practical value of such commissions
is severely limited in that they act in an advisory capacity only.
In Illinois, the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission has
been created to plan for a six-county area around Chicago, but
the Commission has no power to implement its planning de-
cisions .13
(5) State Assumption or Regulation. Assumption of some of the
governmental powers or services of the metropolitan area by a
state agency or department can be helpful in limited activities
such as highway development, traffic codes, and court systems.
However, any extensive attempt by the state as a whole to dic-
tate what has traditionally been local policy will run counter to
the public sentiment which attaches to such ideas as home rule,
local option, and local self-determination. In addition, in Illinois
(and some other states as well), such action probably would
either violate the constitution or upset the entire local tax struc-
ture.'
4
Having rejected the foregoing solutions as unworkable, let us pro-
ceed to delineate the more promising alternative. It would appear that
12 The Illinois annexation provisions are found in ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, §§ 7-1 and
7-2 (1967).
13 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 85, § 1117 (1967). Section 17 of the act, pertaining to powers
of the commission, states:
In the exercise of these powers or of any other powers granted to it under this Act or
specifically under any other law, the Commission shall act solely as an advisory body
to units of government, to agencies of the State and Federal governments, and to in-
terested persons; its plans, policies, research findings and recommendations shall have no
binding effect on such units of government, agencies, or persons . ...
14 The constitution provides:
The general assembly shall not impose taxes upon municipal corporations, or the in-
habitants or property thereof, for corporate purposes . ...
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 10. See People v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 328 Ill. 440, 159 N.E.
797 (1928).
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any real solution to the jurisdictional problem will require the existence
of some sort of super-government with substantial powers. This could
theoretically be a single government for the entire metropolitan area
which supersedes and replaces all existing governments. Or it might
take the form of a federation or added layer of government wherein
most of the existing bodies maintain their identity. The former alter-
native was adopted in Colorado for the Denver metropolitan area in
1902 by an amendment to the state constitution.' 5 However, this is a
politically drastic method of meeting the problem, and other localities
have found it expedient to use a more gradual or federated approach.' 6
The form or structural unit which is utilized as the super-government
could be the county,' 7 a merged city-county, 8 or a metropolitan special
district (or authority)." The essential thing is that the super-govern-
ment be organized and empowered, so as to meet problems (a) through
(e) outlined above.
THE LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES
The City. Although annexation was rejected earlier as a possible solu-
tion to the jurisdictional problem in the Chicago area, it should be
pointed out that there is a specific constitutional provision which in
theory would allow extension of the city to cover the metropolitan area
and would also allow for consolidation."0 This part of the constitution,
known as the "Chicago Home Rule Amendment," was adopted in 1904.
In practice it has proved of little value, and dissatisfaction was articu-
lately expressed as early as 1915.21 The basic problem seems to be po-
litical rather than legal, although it stems from the requirement in the
constitution that separate majorities must be achieved both in the City
15 CoLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1.
16 E.g., Dade County (Miami), Florida; St. Louis, Missouri; Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia; Toronto and Winnepeg, Canada.
17 See FLA. CONST. art. 8, § 11.
18As in Nashville, Tennessee. See TENN. CODE ANN., § 6-3701 ff. (1967). Cf. Mo.
CONST. art. 6, § 31.
19 As provided for now by Washington law. WASH. REV. CODE, ch. 35.58 (1967).
20 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 34.
21 Goodwin, How Should the Illinois Constitution be Amended?, 9 ILL. L. REV. 601
(1915).
1968]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
of Chicago and in the area to be annexed, in order to effect annexation.
Because the obstacles here have been proved by time to be formidable,
and are essentially political, this paper will not deal further with this
possibility.
The County. In considering a structure for the super-government,
the county immediately suggests itself as a likely possibility. In Illi-
nois, as in most states, the county has been basically an administrative
subdivision of the state rather than a local government formed to deal
with local problems. Increasingly, however, new and significant powers
have been given to the counties,22 and there appear to be no impedi-
ments toward delegating even greater powers. Article X of the Illinois
constitution provides for county organization and establishes the offices
of county clerk, sheriff, treasurer, circuit clerk, and recorder of deeds.23
Because of their constitutional basis, these offices could not be abol-
ished or placed under the direct control of a county legislative body
(commissioners or board of supervisors) without constitutional amend-
ment.24 However, with respect to the bulk of local governmental func-
tions which are not attached to those offices, there appears to be
sufficient flexibility to permit the organization of an effective super-
government. It should also be noted that the constitution specifically
requires the legislative body of Cook County to be composed of ten
persons elected from the City of Chicago, and five persons from
outside the city.
25
This brings us to a consideration of the usefulness of the county as
a super-government in the Chicago area itself. Assuming that the state
constitution will allow delegation to the county of sufficient powers,
and that the county can be adequately organized, a further and greater
problem arises. Whatever definition of metropolitan area is used, it is
clear that the Chicago metropolitan area now extends beyond Cook
County. More than one million people live on the periphery outside
Cook, and that periphery is, of course, the fastest growing area.26
Therefore, in order to use the county as the basic super-government
for the whole metropolitan area, there must be a merger of several
2 2 See, e.g., power to zone, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 3151 (1967).
23 ILL. CONST. art. X, § 8.
24 See, e.g., People v. Board of Comrs., 397 Ill. 293, 74 N.E.2d 503 (1947).
25 ILL, CONST. art. X, § 7. However, cf. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
2 6 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 82, 92, 618 (1967).
[Vol. XVIII: 119
LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL REFORM
counties, or Cook must be enlarged by a transfer of territory from
the adjoining counties.
Here we run afoul of certain constitutional provisions. First of all,
no county can be reduced in size to less than 400 square miles." Du-
Page, directly adjoining Cook to the west and the most populous of the
peripheral counties, is already less than 400 square miles in area. Lake,
to the north and the second most populous county, has only 457 square
miles. The same problem is presented to a lesser degree with the other
peripheral counties.28 Thus, it is impossible to transfer any significant
amount of territory to Cook County without violating this constitutional
provision.
A merger of the counties involved is the other alternative. But a
merger of counties can be accomplished only by obtaining a majority
vote in favor of merger in a popular referendum in each county.29 This
creates an extremely difficult political problem since the failure to
achieve a majority vote in one or two out of six counties could ruin the
entire scheme. All of the counties, except Cook, also have rural areas of
varying extent, and the inhabitants of those areas, though in the mi-
nority, could significantly affect the outcome of an election. This rural
vote would most likely be opposed to inclusion in a metropolitan su-
per-government. In addition, the partisan lines are clearly drawn as
well. Cook County is traditionally a Democratic stronghold, and the
peripheral counties are usually heavily Republican." Therefore, from
a political standpoint, the odds in favor of a county merger are rather
remote.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the inherent difficulty in uti-
lizing the county as the organ of metropolitan government is that the
county line almost never coincides with the area of the metropolitan
community. A quick glance at a map of the Chicago area will show that
while the Cook County boundaries are not large enough to encompass
27 ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
28 For references to the figures see note 26, supra.
2o See ILL. CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 2, 3. These provisions do not specifically provide for
referenda in each county in the merger situation. However, taken together, that is their
most probable effect. This was so held in People v. Marshall, 12 I1. 391 (1851), which
was decided under identical provisions of the constitution of 1848, the forerunner of the
present constitution.
80 Note 26, supra.
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the metropolis, the combined area of Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, Mc-
Henry and Will (all included in the SMSA) is much too large. 1
The Metropolitan Authority. The formation of a metropolitan "ser-
vice district" or metropolitan "authority" as a new and distinct
governmental entity holds much greater promise than the county as a
structure for the super-government. It seems well established that the
legislature has comparatively unlimited power to create any type of
local governmental body which circumstances may require. In the lead-
ing case of People v. Bowman,32 the creation of a sanitary district was
upheld against the contention that the legislature had exceeded its
powers. The court said:
The constitution contains no prohibition against the creation by the legislature
of every conceivable description of corporate authorities, and the endowment of
them, when created, with all the faculties and attributes of other pre-existing
corporate authorities .... Nor is the General Assembly, in exercising its power
to authorize the organization of municipal corporations with powers of taxation
for corporate purposes, limited by the boundaries of pre-existing corporations or
compelled to adopt their corporate authorities. 83
A number of innovative governmental structures have accordingly been
upheld by the Illinois court including the Chicago Transit Authority,
34
the Chicago Regional Port District,35 and local airport authorities.
3 6
Federation. Although there is no legal objection to the creation of an
additional top layer of government in the form of a metropolitan author-
ity, we are still left with a miniature federal problem. Thus, the ques-
tion becomes which powers or functions should be allocated to the
super-government, and which should remain with the existing cities,
counties, and special districts. 7 At one extreme, the cities and special
districts could be abolished and the counties' functions curtailed to the
constitutional minimums with an all-powerful metropolitan authority.
31 This problem is not peculiar to the Chicago area. 117 out of the 228 SMSA's extend
into more than one county. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 941-944 (1967).
32247 Ill. 276, 93 N.E. 244 (1910).
33 Id. at 286, 93 N.E. at 248.
3 People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 Ill. 77, 64 N.E.2d 4 (1945).
85 People v. Chicago Regional Port Dist., 4 IlI. 2d 363, 123 N.E.2d 92 (1954).
36 People v. Wood, 391 Ill. 237, 62 N.E.2d 809 (1945).
37 For a discussion of this question primarily from an economist's point of view see
Hirsch, Local Versus Areawide Urban Government Services, 17 NAT. TAX J. 331 (1964).
[Vol. XVIII: 119
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At the other end of the spectrum is the limited assumption of one
function, e.g. sewage disposal, by the authority, with the pre-existing
units retaining practically all their powers. It seems clear that the for-
mer extreme is undesirable as well as being politically unworkable,
while the latter extreme does not effectively meet the jurisdictional
problem. The functions to be performed by the metropolitan authority
must be limited and yet substantial. Whether this can be done success-
fully may be questioned in view of the Miami, Florida, experience, in
which litigation quickly developed over the "federal" issue.5
An example of legislation which appears to be politically workable
and also amenable to the Illinois constitutional and legal frame-
work as well as that of most other states can be found in the State of
Washington. 9 There, in 1957, enabling legislation was passed to permit
3 5 See Miami Shores Village v. Cowart, 108 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1958), and Comment,
Metro and its Judicial History, 15 U. Mai.Am L. REV. 283 (1961).
39WASH. REV. COME § 35.58.010 ff. (1967), upheld in Municipality of Metropolitan
Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 446, 357 P.2d 863 (1960).
35.58.260 Transportation function-Acquisition of city systems. If a metropol-
itan municipal corporation shall be authorized to perform the metropolitan transportation
function, it shall, upon the effective date of the assumption of such power, have and
exercise all rights with respect to the construction, acquisition, maintenance, operation,
extension, alteration, repair, control and management of passenger transportation which
any component city shall have been previously empowered to exercise and such powers
shall not thereafter be exercised by such component cities without the consent of the
metropolitan municipal corporation: Provided, That any city owning and operating a
public transportation system on such effective date may continue to operate such system
within such city until such system shall have been acquired by the metropolitan municipal
corporation and a metropolitan municipal corporation shall not acquire such system
without the counsent of the city council of such city.
35.58.265 Acquisition of existing transportation system-Assumption of labor
contracts-Transfer of employees-Preservation of employee benefits--Collec-
tive bargaining. If a metropolitan municipal corporation shall perform the metropolitan
transportation function and shall acquire any existing transportation system it shall
assume and observe all existing labor contracts relating to such system and, to the
extent necessary for parking facilities and properties and such other facilities and
properties as may be necessary for passenger and vehicular access to and from such
terminal and parking facilities and properties, together with all lands, rights of way,
property, equipment and accessories necessary for such systems and facilities. Public
transportation facilities and properties which are owned by any city may be acquired or
used by the metropolitan municipal corporation only with the consent of the city council
of the city owning such facilities. Cities are hereby authorized to convey or lease such
facilities to metropolitan corporations or to contract for their joint use on such terms
as may be fixed by agreement between the city council of such city and the metro-
politan council, without submitting the matter to the voters of such city.
35.58.250 Other local public passenger transportation service prohibited-Agree-
ments-Purchases-Condemnation. Except in accordance with an agreement made
as provided herein, upon the effective date on which the metropolitan municipal cor-
poration commences to perform the metropolitan transportation function, no person or
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the formation of the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle." Steps in or-
ganizing this super-government followed lines typical of special district
formation.4' However, a unique feature provided by this legislation is
that in the original organizing referendum, the voters are permitted
to vote on the function or functions to be performed by the super-
government and that additional functions may be given to the super-
government through the device of subsequent referenda. As to the
federal aspect of this governmental structure, the statute provides:
35.58.050 Functions authorized. A metropolitan municipal corporation shall
have the power to perform any one or more of the following functions, when
authorized in the manner provided in this chapter:
(1) Metropolitan sewage disposal.
(2) Metropolitan water supply.
(3) Metropolitan public transportation.
(4) Metropolitan garbage disposal.
(5) Metropolitan parks and parkways.
(6) Metropolitan comprehensive planning.
35.58.060 Unauthorized functions to be performed under other law. All func-
tions of local government which are not authorized as provided in this chapter
to be performed by a metropolitan municipal corporation, shall continue to be
performed by the counties, cities, and special districts within the metropolitan
area as provided by law.
private corporation shall operate a local public passenger transportation service within
the metropolitan area with the exception of taxis, busses owned or operated by a school
district or private school, and busses owned or operated by any corporation or organiza-
tion solely for the purposes of the corporation or organization and for the use of which
no fee or fare is charged.
An agreement may be entered into between the metropolitan municipal corporation
and any person or corporation legally operating a local public passenger transportation
service wholly within or partly within and partly without the metropolitan area and on
said effective date under which such person or corporation may continue to operate
such service or any part thereof for such time and upon such terms and conditions as
provided in such agreement. Where any such local public passenger transportation service
will be required to cease to operate within the metropolitan area, the commission may
agree with the owner of such service to purchase the assets used in providing such ser-
vice, or if no agreement can be reached, the commission shall condemn such assets in
the manner provided herein for the condemnation of other properties.
Wherever a privately owned public carrier operates wholly or partly within a metro-
politan municipal corporation, the Washington utilities and transportation commission
shall continue to exercise jurisdiction over such operation as provided by law.
40 From the standpoint of political feasibility, it should be noted that the super-
government actually formed in Seattle was authorized to perform only one function-
sewage disposal.
4' Compare WAsH. REv. CODE § 35.58.090 (1967) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105 § 2-1 ff.
(1967).
[Vol. XVIII: 119
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The statute then provides in fairly elaborate detail a description of
the specific powers of the metropolitan municipal corporation (super-
government) with respect to each particular function which might be
assumed.42
The foregoing enumeration of possible metropolitan functions in the
Washington statute should not be taken as necessarily exhaustive.
Planning and zoning are functions which need a comprehensive ap-
proach to avoid self-defeating inconsistencies in the metropolitan area.
Certainly one of the greatest manifestations of the jurisdictional prob-
lem is in the field of police protection. 3 If this function were given to
the metropolitan super-government, as it probably should be," the
office of sheriff would remain because of its constitutional basis. How-
ever, it seems likely that the sheriff could be limited as a practical mat-
ter to the functions of jailer and process server.45
The Governing Body. The legislature or policy-making body of the
super-government could conceivably be constituted in any of a variety
of ways, possibly including appointment by the governor. 6 A number
42 E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 35.58.240 (1967). Powers Relative to Transportation. If
a metropolitan municipal corporation shall be authorized to perform the function of
metropolitan transportation, it shall have the following powers in addition to the general
powers granted by this chapter.
(1) To prepare, adopt and carry out a general comprehensive plan for public trans-
portation service which will best serve the residents of the metropolitan area and to
amend said plan from time to time to meet changed conditions and requirements.
(2) To acquire by purchase, condemnation gift or grant and to lease, construct, add
to, improve, replace, repair, maintain, operate and regulate the use of metropolitan
transportation facilities and properties within or without the metropolitan area, including
systems of surface, underground or overhead railways, tramways, buses, or any other
means of local transportation except taxis, and including passenger terminal and opera-
tion of facilities, all of the employees of such acquired transportation system whose
duties are necessary to operate efficiently the facilities acquired shall be appointed to
comparable positions to those which they held at the time of such transfer, and no
employee or retired or pensioned employee of such systems shall be placed in any worse
position with respect to pension seniority, wages, sick leave, vacation or other benefits
that he enjoyed as an employee of such system prior to such acquisition. The metro-
politan municipal corporation shall engage in collective bargaining with the duly ap-
pointed representatives of any employee labor organization having existing contracts
with the acquired transportation system and may enter into labor contracts with such
employee labor organization.
43 See PocK, CONSOLIDATING POLICE FUNCTIONS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 49 (1962).
44 PRESIDENT'S COMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 119-123 (1967).
45 See People v. Board of Comrs., 397 Ill. 293, 74 N.E.2d 503 (1947).
46 See Cornell v. People, 107 Ill. 372 (1883).
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of politically interesting schemes of appointment and election have
been upheld by the Illinois court as meeting constitutional require-
ments in the case of single-function governmental units." However, in
the past, the only multi-function local governments have been the
counties and the municipalities, and these have always had elected
governing boards. This apparently does not reflect any necessity im-
posed by the state or federal constitution,48 but rather a general policy
in favor of democratic self-government at the local level. A departure
from this policy is certainly not suggested here.
However, if the super-government's policy makers are to be elec-
ted, then the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Avery v. Midland County '9 appears to govern. That decision, applying
the one-man, one-vote principle to local government, would require
that the governing board be elected from districts of substantially
equal population within the geographic boundary of the super-govern-
ment, or be elected at large from the entire area.
PROBLEMS OF CONSOLIDATION
The Method. In consolidating certain local governmental functions
into one super-government, there appear to be two alternative methods.
One method contemplates action by the state legislature alone, and
the other contemplates enabling legislation coupled with a popular
referendum.
Let us consider the former method first. There is a great deal of
precedent in Illinois for the creation of a unit of local government by
legislative fiat. The act creating a medical center district in Chicago
simply declares the existence of the district in terms of the streets
that border it. 0 Similarly, the Chicago Sanitary District boundaries
have been amended solely by act of the legislature almost fifty times,
although the District was originally created through popular refer-
47See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42, § 301 (1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15 1/2, § 68.3a
(1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, § 219 ff. (1967).
48 Although the state constitution does provide alternatively for election of "county
commissioners" or "township organization" which implies elected officials. ILL. CONST.
art. X, §§ 5, 6, 7.
49 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968). The Court said: "We hold . . . that the Constitution
permits no substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of
local government having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area
served by the body."
50 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, § 125 (1967).
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endum.51 The constitutionality of the Chicago Sanitary District was
upheld at an early date against a number of claims of invalidity, the
most serious being a charge of special legislation. The court held that
since the constitutional provision prohibits local or special laws "incor-
porating cities, towns, or villages," it does not prohibit special laws
creating municipal corporations other than cities, towns, or villages.52
Another example of the formation of a unit of government by leg-
islative act alone is the statute creating the Chicago Regional Port
District. This provides:
There is created a political subdivision, body politic and municipal corporation
by the name of the Chicago Regional Port District embracing all townships num-
bered 36 and 37 of the United States Government Survey, situated in Cook
County, Illinois, and Section 14 in township 37, range 11, of said government
survey, situated in DuPage County, Illinois .... 53
A further example of this method is found in the statute creating the
Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission which simply states that
the metropolitan planning area shall consist of all of the counties of
Lake, Cook, Will, DuPage, Kane and McHenry.54
It should be noted, however, that none of these munincipal bodies
have general governmental powers, and, of the examples mentioned,
only the Sanitary District has a taxing power. An attempt to question
the validity of creating multi-function metropolitan authority on the
grounds that such an entity would be more like a city, town, or village,
might be made, but the argument seems weak, at least where a properly
elected governing board is provided for. It is perhaps for reasons of
policy rather than constitutionality that the second method of consol-
idation, enabling legislation combined with popular referendum, has
been used more often.55
The second method immediately avoids the problem of special leg-
islation since the enabling act can be phrased so as to be applicable
to any locality in the state which has a need for a metropolitan gov-
ernment. Once the enabling legislation is put on the books, the ma-
51 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42, § 320 ff. (1967).
52 Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 13 Ill. 443, 27 N.E. 203 (1890).
53 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 154 (1967), upheld in People v. Chicago Reg. Port Dist., 4
Ill. 2d 363, 123 N.E.2d 92 (1954).
54 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 1103 ff. (1967).
55 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 42, §§ 249 and 299 (1967); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122,
8§ 12-1 and 13-25 (1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127/, § 21 (1967).
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chinery can be put in motion at the local level in the same way that
most special districts are now created.56 Typically, a petition is filed
with the circuit court clerk asking that the unit of government be
formed and setting forth the proposed boundaries. Notice is given,
hearings are undertaken, modifications made, and finally an election
is held and the results certified.
Here it should be pointed out that there is no constitutional require-
ment that separate majorities be obtained in each municipality, special
district, unincorporated area, or county involved. This is true even
though the creation of the super-government may take away important
functions from the constituent municipalities, and may even abolish
some special districts as well as alter the tax burden throughout the en-
tire area affected. The issue was presented in modified form in People
v. Kelly, 7 which upheld the consolidation of 22 separate park districts,
and some areas not included in park districts, into one large "Chicago
Park District." The enabling legislation there provided for a single
referendum vote in the entire area of the proposed new district. Against
the contention that the separate consent or vote of each of the several
districts was required, the court said:
The electors in each of the twenty-two districts who participated in the elec-
tion by which the Chicago Park District Act was adopted, by an overwhelming
majority approved the mode of appointment of corporate authorities therein
provided. The fact that fourteen of the small park districts, by adverse majorities
averaging slightly over 500 each, voted against the adoption of the act, of itself
confers upon them no rights and imposes upon them no burdens not equally pos-
sessed or imposed upon all the other districts involved. The method of corporate
succession provided in the act by the legislature in the exercise of its constitu-
tional power was approved by the electors of the entire area . . . and § 9 and 10
of art. 9 of the Constitution were not thereby infringed.5 8
With respect to the United States Constitution, the issue seems to
have been settled some sixty years ago. A Pennsylvania statute per-
mitted for annexation or merger of contiguous cities by means of a
combined majority vote in both cities. An election was held in the
cities of Pittsburgh and Allegheny. The majority was against merger in
the smaller city of Allegheny, but in favor of a merger in the combined
56 ld.
57 357 111. 408, 192 N.E. 372 (1934).
58 Id. at 418-419, 192 N.E. 372 at 376-377. See also Kocsis v. Chicago Park Dist., 362
IM. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935), and Town of Cicero v. City of Chicago, 182 Ill. 301, 55
N.E. 351 (1899).
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vote, and the merger was accordingly effected. Against the contention
that the statute deprived Allegheny voters of fourteenth amendment
due process rights and violated the impairment of contracts clause of
the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the Pennsyl-
vania law."9 The court stated:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as con-
venient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as
may be entrusted to them. . . . The State, therefore, at its pleasure may modify
or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold
it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite
the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy
the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or
without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these
respects the State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to
the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States. Although the inhabitants and property owners
may by such changes suffer inconvenience, and their property may be lessened
in value by the burden of increased taxation, or for any other reason, they have
no right by contract or otherwise in the unaltered or continued existence of the
corporation or its powers, and there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which
protects them from these injurious consequences.60
The Effects. Whichever method of consolidation is employed, a number
of important consequences will follow which should be briefly ex-
amined. First of all, some special districts may be extinguished as
separate entities, e.g., if the metropolitan authority assumes the func-
tion of sewage disposal, the facilities and operation of most or all sani-
tary districts will be taken over by the super-government. Based on
the decisions in Kelly and Bowman, this consequence creates no con-
stitutional problem. Secondly, some property owners in the corporate
area of the super-government may experience a tax increase while
others may enjoy a decrease. Thus, most of the property owners in an
area presently unincorporated may strongly oppose the formation of
the super-government, and yet the unwanted taxes may be imposed
"without their consent." It was argued that such action in the Chi-
cago Park District consolidation amounted to a deprivation of due
process and violated the equal protection clause of the constitution.
However, in Kocsis v. Chicago Park District,"' a companion case to
59 Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
60 207 U.S. at 178, 179.
61362 111. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935).
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Kelly, the court drawing an analogy to municipal annexation cases,
held that no constitutional rights were infringed. The court said:
When two or more municipalities are combined, the resulting municipal corpo-
ration includes the persons and places of the several municipalities, and it has
the same property and owes the same debts which they all had and owed. The
identity of the component elements, in such cases, is lost and becomes absorbed
into the new creation.62
A third, and related effect of consolidation is that the new super-
government will probably assume the outstanding debts of the muni-
cipal entities which it supersedes and may impose a tax on all property
in the metropolitan area to pay off these debts. Thus, a property owner
may be taxed to pay off indebtedness which was not incurred for his
benefit. This issue was squarely raised in the Kocsis6 3 case, and the
court held that there was no violation of due process, equal protection,
or the special privileges and immunities clause of the state constitu-
tion.
PROBLEMS OF TAXATION
The Federal Problem. Many of the functions which might be per-
formed by a metropolitan government are income producing and can
be financed through revenue bonds and user charges. This is certainly
true of water supply and garbage disposal and probably applies to
public transportation as well. Other functions in the planning and
regulatory area (such as zoning) involve relatively nominal admin-
istrative costs which could easily be met from non-property taxes.
However, there are other important functions which can basically be
supported only by taxation, including such things as police protection,
sewage disposal, and park operations.
Article IX, sections 9 and 10 of the Illinois constitution provide
that while municipal corporations may be given the power to tax for
corporate purposes, the legislature itself may not impose taxes upon
municipal corporations or the property therein for corporate (local)
purposes. In the early case of Morgan v. Schusselle 4 these provisions
were construed to mean that the legislature cannot require one mu-
nicipal corporation to use its taxing power to pay off the indebtedness
or expenses of another.
(2 Id. at 31-32, 198 N.E. at 851.
63 Supra note 61.
64 228 Ill. 106, 81 N.E. 814 (1907).
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In the context of our metropolitan government, this means that the
super-government could not "assess" or require contributions from
the cities and counties within its area in order to raise funds for met-
ropolitan purposes. Although such a scheme of taxation has apparently
been used elsewhere,65 the safest and most feasible taxing method
under the Illinois Constitution would be to provide for a direct and
uniform levy on all property within the metropolitan area for me-
tropolitan purposes.
The Uniformity Requirement. The Illinois Constitution provides, as
do most other state constitutions, that local governments with taxing
powers must impose their property taxes uniformly throughout the
corporate area with the exception of special assessments for local
improvements. 66 The rise of the special district as a device to finance
local governmental projects and services on a tax base which cuts
across traditional jurisdictional lines has led to a drastic modification
in the operation of this constitutional provision. In effect, the special
district is a method of taxing property for a service which benefits
that property without regard to other jurisdictional factors, and yet
the benefit to a particular piece of property is usually found to be more
general and to be spread geographically broader than in the traditional
case of a special assessment for a "local" improvement. Thus, in a
metropolitan area neighboring properties may in fact be taxed at
different rates because different corporate authorities have jurisdiction.
Of course, in theory at least, the properties receive different benefits.
This departure from uniformity in taxation has been held as not vio-
lative of the Illinois Constitution. In People v. Chicago and Western
Ind. R.R.67 the Illinois court said:
The Constitution requires uniformity of taxation in taxing districts, and that
is secured by regarding every taxing district as a separate unit,-the county for
county taxes, the town for town taxes, the city or village for municipal taxes, the
school district for school taxes, and any other district as a like unit.
68
The consolidation of a number of governmental functions into one
super-government may thus create a problem of inequitable taxation.
For example, the merger of several sanitary districts and the transfer
65 See, e.g., WAsH. REV. CODE § 35.58.420 (1967); see also Milner, The Metropolitan
Toronto Plan, 105 U. PA. L. Rxv. 570, 579 (1957).
66 ILL. CO ST. art. IX, §§ 9, 10.
67 256 Ill. 388, 100 N.E. 35 (1912).
6 8 Id. at 392, 100 N.E. at 36.
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of the sewage disposal function from some municipalities into one met-
ropolitan authority, with one uniform tax, will alter the tax burdens
on indivdual properties in the whole area. This result may very well
be desired in many cases; indeed, as pointed out earlier, this may be
one of the reasons for forming a metropolitan government. However,
in other cases this result may not be desirable because only certain
property or a certain limited area may benefit from a particular service
or improvement, and yet the rest of the community would be required
to pay for it.
The obvious solution to this problem is a liberal use of the device
of special assessments for local improvements. However, the Illinios
Constitution states that cities, towns and villages may levy special
assessments. 9 In the early case of Updike v. Wright7 it was held that
drainage districts did not have such power. The court said:
The General Assembly can only vest cities, towns and villages with power to
make local improvements by special assessments, or special taxation upon con-
tiguous property benefited by such improvement. By necessary implication, it is
inhibited from conferring that power upon other municipal corporations or upon
private corporations. Only cities, towns and villages are within the constitutional
provisions, and, although other municipal corporations may be vested with power
to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes, the limitation is absolute, such
taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction
imposing the same.71
Following the Updike case, a constitutional amendment was passed
which expressly gave the power of special assessment to drainage
districts. 72 Shortly thereafter, the Illinois court saw fit, by an inter-
esting course of reasoning, to find that a park district was not pro-
hibited from levying special assessments for local improvements.78
It was later held that sanitary districts also had this taxing power. 74
The writer has been unable to find any further extension of these
holdings to other types of local governments, probably because the
need for such powers in other fields is not significant.75
69 ILL. Co NST. art. IX, § 9.
70 81 Ill. 49 (1876).
71 Id. at 53-54.
7 2 
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 31 (Amended 1878).
73 Dunham v. People, 96 Ill. 331 (1880); see also Van Nada v. Goedda, 263 InI. 105,
104 N.E. 1072 (1914).
74 Taylorville Sanitary District v. Winslow, 317 Ill. 25, 147 N.E. 401 (1925).
75 The power has been given to River Conservancy Districts.. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 42,
§§ 404, 405 (1967). For an authoritative early account of these developments see Wilson
v, Board of Trustees, 133 Ill. 443, 27 N.E. 203 (1890).
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Accordingly, the important question still remains, could our super-
government be given the power to levy special assessments for local
improvements? It certainly could be argued that a metropolitan au-
thority of the kind contemplated in this paper is more like a city,
town, or village than a special district in that it is a comprehensive
local government with multiple functions. Hence, as a matter of con-
struing the original intent of the framers of the constitution, the met-
ropolitan authority should be given this power. In addition, it can
be argued, as it was in modified form in the park district and sanitary
district cases, the constitution should not be construed so as to freeze
the forms of local government into molds appropriate to an earlier
day. Finally, it should be noted that other jurisdictions have seen
fit to construe practically identical constitutional provisions so as to
permit municipal corporations other than cities, towns, and villages
to levy special assessments.76 It seems clear that under the present
constitutional framework the question is an open one.
Debt Limitation. Most states have a limitation on the amount of
indebtedness which can be incurred by a municipal corporation. In
Illinois, the limit is five per cent of the value of the taxable property
in the corporate limits, 77 and presumably this limitation would apply
to our super-government. It is possible that in consolidating the debts
of a number of local governments of different kinds the constitutional
limit might be exceeded. 78 However, in an inflationary era such as we
have had for the past 25 years this possibility is remote. Indebtedness
payable from specific user charges or from revenues from non-prop-
erty tax sources (revenue bonds) are not within the constitutional
limitation.79
DRAWING THE BOUNDARY
Original Formation. Two questions are presented with respect to the
boundaries of the metropolitan government: how should they be drawn
in the first instance, and how can they be changed to accommodate
future growth? The first question is related to the method chosen to
form the super-government as discussed above. If the super-govern-
7 6 See, e.g., Foster v. Commissioners, 100 Wash. 502, 171 P. 539 (1918), construing
WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 9. See also REv. CODE WASH. § 35.58.500 (1967).
77 ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 12.
78 See Kocsis v. Chicago Park District, 362 Ill. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935).
7 9 PeopIe v. City of Chicago, 414 fI1. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953).
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ment is formed directly by act of the legislature as in the case of the
Chicago Regional Port District,8" the determination of the original
boundary could be made by that body. On the other hand, if the
super-government is formed through enabling legislation and popular
referendum, then the petitioners initiating the referendum could draw
their own boundaries along statutory guidelines as is done in forming
an airport authority8 or a park district.82 Once the original boundary
is determined, it can be adjusted in a number of possible ways.
Changing the Boundary. It is clear that if present patterns of urban
development continue, there will be a need to adjust and expand the
boundaries of the metropolitan government from time to time. If no
provision is made for this orderly expansion, the super-government
will itself eventually become a "core city," and the jurisdictional
problem will be regenerated. It is therefore important to devise a
way of systematically expanding the area of the super-government as
conditions require it. One possibility is to permit the metropolitan
authority to annex contiguous territory solely by action of its own
council or legislative body as has been done in some states.83 This
would probably not contravene the Illinois Constitution (unless the
county were used as the unit of super-government), but it is a dras-
tic method since the property owners and residents in the area to be
annexed, are given no voice in the matter.
Another possible device is to permit the legislature to amend the
boundaries as it sees fit. This has the advantage of leaving the decision
to a relatively impartial public body as opposed to leaving it up to
the "annexors" or the "annexees," but such a cumbersome body is not
properly constituted to handle this task. An improvement to this
solution would be to create a specialized commission at the state level,
whose business it would be to decide questions of annexation, merger,
detachment, etc., and give the commissioners statutory standards as a
guide. Minnesota has done this apparently with considerable success. 4
80 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 19, § 154 (1967).
8 1 IL. REv. STAT. ch. 151/2, § 68.1 ff. (1967).
8 2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, § 1-1 (1967).
83 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-117 (1967). This was also formerly possible in
Texas. See City of Houston v. State, 142 Tex. 190, 176 S.W.2d 928 (1943).
84 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 414.01 ff. (1967). See Note, The Minnesota Municipal Com-
mission, 50 MINN. L. REV. 911 (1966).
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There is also the possibility that annexation or expansion could be
made more or less automatic upon the existence of certain conditions.
For example, it might be provided by statute, that if the area in ques-
tion achieved a certain density of population, or was receiving a stip-
ulated level of urban services, it could be declared a part of the
metropolitan authority by action of the metropolitan council, either
on its own initiative or on the initiative of residents of the area. Such
a declaration would, of course, be an administrative action subject
to judicial review, and would be somewhat analogous to rezoning
an area in a city. There appears to be no constitutional objection to
this type of system, provided adequate standards or indexes are pro-
vided to make the determination a factual one. Indeed, there is a
very early case which upholds a similar procedure (although there,
complete discretion was given to the municipality). In Covington v.
East St. Louis,8 5 the city had a charter (issued prior to the present
constitution) which provided:
Any tract of land adjoining the city of East St. Louis, laid off into city or
town lots, a plat of which being duly recorded in the recorder's office of St.
Clair county, shall be and form a part of the city of East St. Louis: Provided,
the city council shall, by ordinance, so declare.80
The court held that an annexation made under this provision did not
violate the constitution.87
It is suggested that either an automatic system like that proposed
above, or the Minnesota plan, so organized as to favor expansion
where needed, should be utilized to adjust the boundaries of the
super-government rather than more conventional annexation proce-
dures. This would help avoid regenerating the jurisdictional problem
which the super-government is designed to solve.
Multiple Boundaries. It is very likely that the most appropriate area
for the metropolitan authority to exercise its jurisdiction with respect
to sewage disposal, will not be the most appropriate area for water
supply, police protection, or land-use regulation. The question may
thus be raised, could the super-government operate with several
boundaries, each serving one governmental function? The answer
is yes and no. In the case of tax supported activities, the uniformity
85 78 Ill. 548 (1875).
86 Id. at 550.
87 1d. at 553.
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requirement of the constitution88 would appear to make the boundary
for all general taxation coincide with the boundary for political rep-
resentation, and this is "the boundary" of the corporation. 8 How-
ever, with respect to revenue-producing services which are basically
self-supporting, there is no objection to extending the services on a con-
tract or cooperative basis beyond the area of the super-government. 0
There is probably room for some flexibility, however, in the exercise
of governmental functions on the periphery of the metropolitan area.
The Illinois legislature has recognized the necessity for authorizing
some extraterritorial powers for cities such as purchasing, condemning,
and constructing airports,"x water supply, and sewage facilities92 be-
yond the city boundary and permitting cities to zone one and a half
miles beyond their borders. Statutory provisions like these have been
upheld in many jurisdictions. 4 Hence, it is quite likely that the met-
ropolitan government could be given all of the extra-territorial powers
which it may need.
CONCLUSION
There are no major legal obstacles to solving the jurisdictional
problem in the Chicago area, although the state and federal constitu-
tions impose certain requirements and limitations in the establishment
of a metropolitan government. The outline of the most promising
structure seems clear. A "Metropolitan Authority" can be formed by
a single referendum held throughout the metropolitan area. The gov-
erning body of the new government would be elected on a one-man,
one-vote basis. The powers of the metropolitan authority would be
substantial but limited and clearly differentiated from those powers
88 ILL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 9, 10.
89 It seems unlikely that the uniformity requirement would permit the division of
the metropolitan area into a "general service district" and an "urban service district"
with different tax consequences as is done in the Tennessee metropolitan legislation. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3701 (1967).
90 See GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA 90 (L. Lyon
ed. 1957).
91 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-101-1 ff. (1967).
9 2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-139-2 (1967).
93 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (1967).
94 See, e.g., White v. City of Decatur, 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873 (1932).
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left to the municipalities. Power of taxation can be given to the au-
thority to be exercised uniformly over the entire metropolitan area,
with the possibility that special assessment districts can be created
for local improvements. Provision can be made for the orderly and
necessary expansion of the metropolitan government. A large number
of local governmental units will be merged and lose their separate
identities, and the cities and counties will give up some of their
powers.
Since the legal problems are few and the method is visible, perhaps
at this point the question should be answered as to why metropolitan
government has not already been instituted in the Chicago area and
similar localities. The answer is partly political, and that aspect of it
cannot be dealt with here. However, part of the reason seems to be that
a number of half-way measures have been taken to meet the jurisdic-
tional problem which have been moderately successful. These measures,
or governmental devices, have been referred to throughout this paper.
They are such things as the Chicago Transit Authority, the Chicago
Sanitary District, the Chicago Regional Port Authority, and the
Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission. None of these devices is
comprehensive enough as presently constituted to serve the entire
metropolitan area except the Planning Commission, and its grave defect
lies in being purely advisory. But the basic deficiency in this method
of approaching the jurisdictional problem is that it substitutes ver-
tically fragmented government for horizontally fragmented govern-
ment. There is still no politically responsible body which can control
the way in which the tax dollar is spent or services are rendered. It
seems clear to this writer that as time goes by, a more fundamental
and straightforward solution to the problem will be required in the
Chicago area and in many other urban centers throughout the country.
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